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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the right of access 
to a court guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) means that States cannot lawfully grant immunity beyond what is strictly 
required by international law.
2
 The right is not an exception to the law of immunity, 
but a limitation on domestic courts’ discretion on the exercise of jurisdiction. Article 
47(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter), which is applicable to 
EU Member States when they are implementing or giving effect to EU law, contains a 
right of access to a court identical to that of Article 6(1) ECHR. Consequently, 
claimants seeking to enforce rights derived from the EU before UK courts can now 
rely on Article 47(2) of the Charter to require UK courts to examine whether the grant 
of immunity under the State Immunity Act 1998 (SIA) or the common law gives 
effect to an international obligation to grant immunity, and if not, to require the 
domestic grant of immunity to be set aside.
3
 The first immunity case to rely on the 
right of access to a court under the EU Charter is Benkharbouche v Sudan, which 
involved employment claims by domestic service staff against the London embassies 
of Sudan and Libya respectively.
4
 The English Court of Appeal ruled that, as the 
scope of the provisions of the SIA granting immunity to these States was not strictly 
required by international law, they conflicted with the complainants’ right of access to 
a court and, pursuant to the rule that EU law must be given priority over inconsistent 
domestic law, cannot be applied. The decision has raised a few eyebrows because it is 
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the first time that an English court has applied the EU Charter to set aside provisions 
of an Act of Parliament in a dispute between private parties.
5
  
 This article discusses the right of access to a court under the EU Charter and 
the way in which it is given effect in UK law, before critically examining the 
application of the right in the Benkharbouche case. In particular, it considers the 
analysis of the Court of Appeal that suggests a grant of immunity means that a court 
has no jurisdiction to exercise such that the right of access to a court is not engaged, 
and whether such a right must have horizontal effect in order to be applicable in a 
case involving private parties. It argues that the Court’s reasoning on these issues is 
erroneous. First, the right of access to a court is always engaged in immunity cases 
because immunity does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction ab initio. Second, the 
right of access to a court is always enforced against the forum State; it therefore has 
indirect—not horizontal—effect in a case between private parties: the Charter right is 
not being enforced by one private party against the other, but rather, against the State, 
the effect of which is to modify the scope of the SIA. 
  
II. THE ‘RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A COURT’ UNDER THE EU CHARTER 
 
A. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in English Law 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
6
 codifies fundamental rights drawn from the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Community Social Charter 
1989, the Council of Europe’s Social Charter 1961, the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU),
 7
 and the constitutional traditions common to the EU Member States as 
general principles of Union law. The Charter is accompanied by a document entitled 
‘Charter Explanations’, which was prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of 
the Convention that drafted the Charter and which provides additional guidance for 
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interpreting the Charter rights. The CJEU and Member State courts are required by 
EU law to consider the Explanations alongside the Charter provisions.
8
  
 Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,
9
 made the EU Charter part of the primary law of the EU by 
providing that it ‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. The Charter rights 
are applicable to—that is, they bind—the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the EU, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, and the EU Member States 
when they are implementing Union law.
10
 As the CJEU has explained: ‘[t]he 
applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter’.11  
 EU Charter rights are given effect in UK law in two ways. First, by 
incorporation of Article 6(1) TEU: when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 
December 2009,
12
 it amended Article 6(1) TEU, which was already included in the 
list of treaties in section 1(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (EC Act) that 
are given direct legal effect within UK law.
13
 As Article 6(1) TEU stipulates that the 
Charter has the same legal effect as the EU treaties, the result is that UK courts must 
now give legal effect to directly effective Charter rights
14
 when applying or 
interpreting EU law in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the EC Act. 
This includes circumstances in which courts are applying or interpreting UK 
legislation that seeks to give effect to EU rights or obligations. Crucially for immunity 
cases, in situations where the SIA conflicts with the right of access to a court under 
the Charter, section 2(4) of the EC Act would require UK courts to give priority to the 
Charter right and set aside conflicting provisions of the SIA.  
                                                 
8
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 Charter rights must also be given effect in UK law if they reflect or embody 
general principles of EU law; that is ‘unwritten principles extrapolated by the [Union] 
Court[s] from the laws of the Member States by a process similar to that of the 
development of the common law by the English courts’.15  Examples include the 
principle of equality, the protection of fundamental rights, the protection of 
proportionality and the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination. General 
principles have a ‘constitutional status’ within the EU:16 the Union courts use the 
principles to assist in the interpretation of the EU treaties and to assess the validity of 
other Union acts. They are also binding on Member States.
17
 In the controversial 
decision of Mangold v Helm,
18
 the CJEU held that general principles of EU law are 
directly effective in domestic law, including in cases between private parties.
19
 
National courts must therefore ensure that domestic legislation giving effect to EU 
law is compatible with the general principles of EU law, which includes setting aside 
incompatible domestic law.
20
 In the UK, the judicial power to do so is provided by 
section 2(1) of the EC Act, which stipulates that all directly effective EU law should 
be given legal effect in UK law, and section 2(4), which has been interpreted to mean 
that directly effective EU law takes priority over incompatible Acts of Parliament.
21
 
 Although the CJEU was accused of judicial activism in Mangold, and of 
applying a general principle ‘to the detriment of a private party’,22 it nevertheless 
adopted the same reasoning in Kücükdeveci.
23
 In that case, which was heard after the 
Charter became legally binding, the CJEU noted that the principle of equal treatment 
is now given expression in Article 21 of the Charter, but the Court did not explain 
whether Article 21 reflected a pre-existing general principle of EU law (not all 
Charter rights are derived from general principles of EU law), or whether the Treaty 
of Lisbon elevated all of the Charter rights to the status of general principles of EU 
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(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 339. See also A Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to 
Mangold via Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity?’ in C Barnard (ed), Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Law, vol 9 (2007) 8.  
23
 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH [2010] IRLR 346, para 20.  See A Albors-Llorens, 
‘Keeping Up Appearances: The Court of Justice and the Effects of EU Directives’ (2010) 69(3) CLJ 
455. 
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law. In Association de Mediation Sociale (‘AMS’),24 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
did not address this question directly, but it did hold that the wording of Article 27 of 
the Charter, which stipulates that workers must be guaranteed information and 
consultation in good time ‘in the cases and under the conditions provided for by 
Union law and national laws and practices’, suggests that ‘it must be given more 
specific expression in European Union or national law’ before it can be ‘fully 
effective’, ie directly effective.25 Consequently, Article 27 of the Charter could not be 
invoked in a dispute between a trade union and a non-profit association.
26
 The Court 
expressly distinguished Article 27 from Article 21(1), considered in the Kücükdeveci 
case, on the basis that 
 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age at issue in [Kücükdeveci], laid 
down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an 
individual right which they may invoke as such.
27
 
 
The decision in AMS therefore suggests that only some Charter rights are general 
principles of EU law directly effective in national legal systems. In determining which 
rights are general principles of the EU law, national courts will no doubt have to rely 
on the Charter Explanations and the jurisprudence of the CJEU.  
 In summary, under the terms of the EC Act, (1) the Charter—having the status 
of a EU treaty—is given direct effect within UK law, and (2) Charter rights, insofar as 
they reflect general principles of EU law, are directly effective as such. However, in 
both instances, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter are only 
applicable when the UK is giving effect to EU rights or obligations.
28
 
 
B. The Right of Access to a Court 
 
The Charter does not expressly set out a right of access to a court, but Article 47, 
which is based on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, implies such a right. The relevant 
part of Article 47 provides that:  
 
                                                 
24
 Case C-176/12 Association de Mediation Sociale [2014] ECR I-000 (hereinafter ‘AMS’).  
25
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 Page 6 of 21 
1. Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
laid down in this Article.  
2. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.  
 
According to the Charter Explanations and the jurisprudence of the CJEU,
29
 Article 
47(1) corresponds to Article 13 ECHR (the right to an effective remedy) and 47(2) 
corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR (the right to a fair trial). As Article 52(3) of the 
Charter stipulates that where Charter rights correspond to rights under the ECHR, ‘the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same’, the meaning and scope of 
Article 47(1) and (2) corresponds to Articles 13 and 6 ECHR respectively.
30
  
 Article 47(1) corresponds to Article 13 ECHR, but it differs in one crucial 
respect: whereas Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a ‘national 
authority’, Article 47(1) guarantees an effective remedy before a ‘tribunal’. In Golder 
v United Kingdom, the ECtHR concluded that Article 13 ECHR does not imply a right 
of access to a court because (1) it only guarantees a remedy before a ‘national 
authority’, which might not be a court or tribunal;31 and (2) it only guarantees a 
remedy for the violation of a right under the ECHR, and not for the enforcement of 
civil rights or criminal charges generally.
32
 Neither of these factors apply to Article 
47(1), as it refers to a remedy before a tribunal, not a national authority, and it 
guarantees an effective remedy where any and all rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the law of the Union are violated, not just when Charter rights are violated. The right 
of access to a tribunal must, by definition, be inherent in the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal, notwithstanding that the effect of Article 52(3) of the 
Charter and the Charter Explanations is that Article 47(1) has the same meaning and 
scope of Article 13 ECHR. 
 The ECtHR has held that the right of access to a court constitutes an inherent 
element of the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1).
33
 As Article 47(2) corresponds to 
                                                 
29
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Designs) (OHIM), para 33. 
30
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31
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32
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33
 ibid para 36.  
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Article 6(1) ECHR, it follows that the right of access to a court is also an inherent 
element of the fair trial guarantees in that article. However, Article 47(2) is not 
confined to civil law rights and obligations and criminal charges: it applies to any and 
all rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law, and is engaged whenever Member 
States are applying or giving effect to EU law.
34
 
 Although Article 47(2) and Article 6(1) have the same scope, the legal effect 
of their violation in UK law is significantly different. In cases involving the EU 
Charter, if a compatible interpretation of the national legislation cannot be found, the 
court is required by EU and UK law to give priority to the Charter. As many of the 
Charter rights are coextensive with ECHR rights, this arguably creates an arbitrary 
distinction between human rights claims that involve EU law, where domestic law 
that prevents individuals from realizing their EU rights will not be applied, and 
human rights claims that ‘only’ come within the ECHR, where, if a compatible 
interpretation between the domestic law and the ECHR right cannot be found, the 
only ‘remedy’ would be a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 
HRA.
35
 Such a distinction is not only difficult to justify in its own right, but it also 
circumvents the constitutional division of competence in the HRA between the 
judiciary and Parliament. 
 
III. ARTICLE 47 AND STATE IMMUNITY: THE BENKHARBOUCHE CASE 
 
A. The Benkharbouche Claims and the State Immunity Act 
 
Benkharbouche involved two sets of employment claims brought by embassy service 
workers against the Libyan and Sudanese embassies in London. Ms Benkharbouche, a 
Moroccan national, was employed as a cook at the Sudanese embassy in London 
before her dismissal in November 2010. She brought claims against the embassy for 
wrongful dismissal, failure to pay the minimum wage and breach of the Working 
                                                 
34
 Art 51, EU Charter.  
35
 As R Garnett, ‘State and Diplomatic Immunity and Employment Rights: European Law to the 
Rescue?’ (2015) 64(4) ICLQ 783, 816 has noted ‘employees will be encouraged to circumvent State 
immunity restrictions under domestic law by pleading breaches of EU regulations without the need (in 
the UK context at least) of having first to comply with the interpretative requirement of section 3 of the 
HRA’. 
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Time Regulations 1998.
36
 Ms Janah, also a Moroccan national, had been employed as 
a member of the domestic staff at the Libyan embassy in London, where her duties 
‘included cooking, cleaning, laundering, shopping and serving meals’.37 She brought 
claims against the Libyan embassy for wrongful dismissal, arrears of pay, racial 
discrimination and harassment (relying on law incorporating the Race Discrimination 
Directive),
38
 and breach of the Working Time Regulations. Both States claimed 
immunity under section 1 of the SIA and relying on sections 4(2)(b) and 16(1)(a) SIA. 
Although section 4(1) SIA removes immunity in proceedings relating to a contract of 
employment made or due to be performed wholly or partly in the UK, section 4(2)(b) 
reinstates immunity where, if at the time the contract was entered into, the employee 
was neither a national of the UK nor habitually resident in the UK. It was conceded 
that Ms Janah was not habitually resident in the UK when her contract of employment 
was made, and the question whether Ms Benkharbouche was habitually resident had 
not yet been resolved.
39
 
Section 16(1)(a) of the SIA provides that the exception to immunity under 
section 4(1) does not apply to proceedings concerning the employment of members of 
a mission within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(VCDR) or of the members of a consular post within the meaning of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Article 1 of the VCDR, as incorporated 
into English law by Schedule 1 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964, includes as 
part of the mission ‘members of the service staff’, which are defined as ‘members of 
the staff of the mission in the domestic service of that mission’. Mses Benkharbouche 
and Janah were both members of the service staff of an embassy and therefore 
members of the mission for the purposes of Section 16(1)(a) SIA.  
 
B. Challenging the State Immunity Act  
 
The claimants argued that the grant of immunity under the SIA infringed their right of 
access to a court guaranteed by Article 6(1) ECHR and, in respect of the employment 
claims involving EU law, by Article 47 of the EU Charter. Lloyd Jones LJ began by 
                                                 
36
 The Working Time Regulations incorporated Directive 2003/88/EC, OJ [2003] L 299/9 into English 
law. 
37
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 4.  
38
 Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ [2000] L 180/22.  
39
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 54. 
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observing that there are divergent approaches to the question whether State immunity 
is actually a restriction on the right of access to a court.
40
 The ECtHR has always 
treated immunity as prima facie interfering with the right of access to a court. 
However, there is some divergent authority in English courts that suggests the right of 
access to a court is not even engaged where international law requires States to grant 
immunity because the grant of immunity deprives the courts of jurisdiction ab initio. 
In Holland v Lampen Wolfe, Lord Millett, with whom Lords Cooke and Hobhouse 
agreed (forming the majority on this point), observed that 
 
[a]t first sight [Article 6] may appear to be inconsistent with a doctrine of 
comprehensive and unqualified State immunity in those cases where it is applicable. 
But in fact there is no inconsistency. This is not because the right guaranteed by art 6 is 
not absolute but subject to limitations, nor is it because the doctrine of State immunity 
serves a legitimate aim. It is because art 6 forbids a contracting State from denying 
individuals the benefit of its powers of adjudication; it does not extend the scope of 
those powers.  
[…] 
[Article 6] presupposes that the contracting states have the powers of adjudication 
necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. But it does not confer on contracting states 
adjudicative powers which they do not already possess. State immunity … is a creature 
of customary international law and derives from the equality of sovereign states. It is 
not a self-imposed restriction on the jurisdiction of its courts which the United 
Kingdom has chosen to adopt. It is a limitation imposed from without upon the 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself.  
 … The United Kingdom cannot, by its own act of acceding to the [ECHR] and without 
the consent of the United States [the foreign State defendant in this case], obtain a 
power of adjudication over the United States which international law denies it.
41
 
 
Lord Millett’s view was later endorsed in dicta by Lords Bingham and Hoffmann in 
Jones v Saudi Arabia, with Lord Hoffmann stating that ‘there is not even a prima 
facie breach of article 6 if a state fails to make available a jurisdiction which it does 
not possess’42 and Lord Bingham reasoning that 
 
[b]ased on the old principle par in parem non habet imperium, the rule of international 
law is not that a state should not exercise over another state a jurisdiction which it has 
but that (save in cases recognised by international law) a state has no jurisdiction over 
another state. I do not understand how a state can be said to deny access to its court if it 
has no access to give.
43
 
                                                 
40
 ibid para 12.  
41
 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 3 All ER 833, 846–847. 
42
 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 298, para 64. 
43
 ibid para 14. cf the Court of Appeal decision in Jones v Saudi Arabia [2005] QB 699, 747, para 82 
(‘In the light of the reasoning in Al-Adsani, there can be no doubt (contrary to dicta of Lord Millett in 
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe at p.1588) that article 6(1) is also prima facie engaged in a case such as the 
present.’). 
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In Benkharbouche, Lloyd Jones LJ explained that the Court of Appeal found Lord 
Millett’s reasoning in Holland v Lampen Wolfe ‘compelling’, stating:44 
 
[i]t is difficult to see how Article 6 can be engaged if international law denies to the 
Contracting State jurisdiction over a dispute. There can be no denial of justice for 
which the State is responsible if there is, as a matter of international law, no court 
capable of exercising jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 6 cannot have been intended to 
confer on Contracting States a jurisdiction which they would not otherwise possess, nor 
could it have conferred a jurisdiction denied by general international law in such a way 
as to be binding on non-Contracting States. It is unfortunate that in none of its many 
decisions in which the point has raised has the Strasbourg court grappled with these 
considerations.
45
 
 
Ultimately Lloyd Jones LJ found that it was unnecessary to choose between the 
approach of the ECtHR and the approach of the majority in Holland v Lampen Wolfe, 
despite the fact that, as a decision of the House of Lords, Holland is binding 
precedent. The Lord Justice proceeded on the basis that under both approaches there 
must be an examination of the law of immunity; it is only that, under the approach 
taken by the ECtHR, ‘any debate as to what are the applicable rules of international 
law is transferred to a later stage of the analysis and dressed in the context of Article 
6’.46 In Belhaj v Straw, Lloyd Jones LJ adopted the same position, explaining that 
‘Article 6 can have no application in situations where international law denies 
jurisdiction to a national court on grounds of state immunity’,47 and in Rahmatullah v 
Ministry of Defence, Leggatt J noted that the decision in Holland ‘seems to me to be 
compelling’.48 
With respect, Lord Millett’s reasoning in Holland v Lampen Wolfe—and the 
supportive dicta it receives from Lords Bingham and Hoffman, and by Lloyd Jones LJ 
is erroneous: it confuses the question whether a UK court possesses jurisdiction (both 
as a matter of domestic law, and international law) with whether the UK is under an 
international obligation not to exercise its jurisdiction over foreign States.  
 First, it should be noted that generally the jurisdiction of a domestic court is 
determined by relevant rules of domestic law and not whether the exercise of 
                                                 
44
 Writing extrajudicially on Lampen-Wolfe, Lloyd Jones LJ ‘commend[ed]’ the approach adopted by 
Lord Millett: DL Jones, ‘Article 6 ECHR and Immunities Arising in Public International Law’ (2003) 
52 ICLQ 463, 470.  
45
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 16.  
46
 ibid.  
47
 Belhaj and another v Straw and others (United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and others 
intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, [2015] 2 WLR 1105, 1156, para 122.  
48
 [EWHC] 3846 (QB) (Leggatt J) para 90. 
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adjudicative jurisdiction is permitted under international law.
49
 In England and Wales, 
a court will have jurisdiction in a civil case as soon as a valid claim form (historically 
known as a ‘writ’) has been correctly served on the defendant.50 If it has not been 
correctly served, the case will be struck out for lack of jurisdiction before the question 
of immunity is even considered.
51
 
 Second, State immunity operates as a bar to jurisdiction; it does not connote 
the absence of jurisdiction.
52
 It is only once an English court has jurisdiction that it 
then will consider whether that jurisdiction is debarred by immunity arising under the 
SIA or under customary international law as incorporated into the common law. 
Under international law, States generally have discretion to exercise their jurisdiction 
in civil cases, but an obligation to bar the exercise of that jurisdiction when the 
defendant is a foreign State engaged in acta jure imperii. The bar to jurisdiction does 
not mean that a State cannot exercise jurisdiction, only that if it does so, it will be in 
breach of its obligation under international law to refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction.
53
 Some support for this interpretation of immunity can be found in the 
Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant 
case before the International Court of Justice:  
 
the impression is created that immunity has value per se, whereas in reality it is an 
exception to a normative rule which would otherwise apply. It reflects, therefore, an 
interest which in certain circumstances prevails over an otherwise predominant interest, 
it is an exception to jurisdiction which normally can be exercised and it can only be 
invoked when the latter exists. It represents an interest of its own that must always be 
balanced, however, against the interest of that norm to which it is an exception.
54
 
 
This is why—as O’Keefe explained in his comment on Jones—Lord Bingham’s 
reliance on the maxim ‘par in parem non habet imperium’, which is commonly used 
                                                 
49
 This point is also made by R O’Keefe, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of the 
International Law of Jurisdiction’ (2013) 26(3) LJIL 541, 543. 
50
 Civil Procedure Rules, rule 7.2 (prior to 26 April 1999, a ‘writ’ had to be served on a defendant). See 
also Canada Trust Company v Stolzenberg (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 1, 21–22. 
51
 See Civil Procedure Rules, rule 11. A defendant may apply to the court for an order declaring that it 
has no jurisdiction and in the alternative, should not exercise any jurisdiction that it may have.  
52
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 2002, p. 
3, at 24-5, para 59. See also X Yang, ‘State Immunity in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Reaffirmations and Misconceptions’ (2003) 74 BYBIL 333, 340. 
53
 See Article 6 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States requires State parties to 
‘give effect to State immunity … by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before its 
court against another State’ (emphasis added) (not in force).   
54
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para 71. See also para 59 of the 
judgment (n 52) above. 
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to justify State immunity, to suggest that the forum State cannot exercise jurisdiction 
when recognizing the immunity of a foreign State is inaccurate: the maxim ‘is not 
intended to deny that a State may in fact exercise its domestic jurisdiction over 
another’, but rather that ‘an equal does not rightly have jurisdiction over an equal’.55 
This understanding of immunity is also demonstrated by the right of States to waive 
immunity, both as a matter of international law and under the SIA in the UK:
56
 the 
waiver enables the domestic court to exercise its underlying jurisdiction; it cannot 
properly be understood as constituting a conferral of jurisdiction by a foreign State on 
the forum court.
57
 It only means that the UK may lawfully exercise its jurisdiction as 
a matter of international law and the English court may exercise its jurisdiction under 
UK domestic law.
58
  
Third, in light of the above analysis, it is clear that Lord Millett and Lloyd 
Jones LJ’s conclusion that Article 6(1) ECHR cannot have been intended to confer a 
jurisdiction that States would not otherwise possess, ‘nor [confer] a jurisdiction 
denied by general international law’ misses the point: Article 6 only requires that 
States exercise jurisdiction that they already possess, but might otherwise have chosen 
not to exercise pursuant to another rule of international law. 
In contrast to Lord Millett’s position, the ECtHR has repeatedly treated Article 
6 as prima facie engaged in immunity cases.
59
 Recognizing that the right of access to 
a court is not absolute, the Court has held that (1) ‘the grant of sovereign immunity to 
a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international 
law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of 
another State’s sovereignty’, 60  and (2) ‘measures taken by [States] which reflect 
                                                 
55
 R O’Keefe, ‘Decisions of British Courts during 2006 Involving Questions of Public International 
Law’ (2006) 77 BYBIL 458, 516. 
56
 See section 2 SIA and art 7, UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property; Yang (n 52 340 and O’Keefe ibid 516. 
57
 Such an interpretation would run counter to the understanding that ‘[j]urisdiction is an aspect of 
sovereignty: it refers to a state’s competence under international law to regulate the conduct of national 
and juridical persons’. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012) 456. 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 123, 
para 57. 
58
 See section 2, SIA.  
59
 See Jones v United Kingdom (n 2) paras 188–189 and Ashingdane v United Kingdom (1985) 7 
EHRR 528, para 57. 
60
 Al-Adsani (2001) 123 ILR 24, 40, para 54. See also Kalogeropoulou v Greece (2002) 129 ILR 537, 
546; Fogarty v United Kingdom (2001) 123 ILR 53, 65, para 34; McElhinney v Ireland (2001) 123 
ILR, 85, para 35; Cudak v Lithuania (2010) 51 EHRR 15, para 60; Sabeh El Leil v France (2012) 54 
EHRR 14, para 52; Wallishauser v Austria, App No 156/04, 17 July 2012, para 64; Oleynikov v Russia 
(2013) 57 EHRR 15, para 60; Jones v United Kingdom (n 2) para 188. 
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generally recognized rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in 
principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access 
to a court as embodied in Article 6(1)’. Save in some specific treaty provisions,61 
international law generally does not require States to exercise their adjudicative 
jurisdiction; it only requires that States decline to exercise their jurisdiction where a 
foreign State or official has a right to immunity. For State parties to the ECHR, the 
right of access to a court reverses this position: States must exercise their jurisdiction 
in cases involving a civil right or obligation, or a criminal charge, unless international 
law requires the State to grant immunity to a foreign State or State official. The right 
of access to a court ensures that States only grant immunity to the extent required by 
international law. State parties must ensure their immunity legislation only grants 
immunity to the extent required by customary international law;
62
 they may not grant 
immunity beyond those strict requirements.
63
 Understood in this way, the right of 
access to a court will never be the basis for an exception to State immunity,
64
 but it 
does require States to limit their grant of immunity in accordance with what is 
required by international law.  
 
C. Whether International Law Requires Sections 16(1)(a) and 4(2)(b) SIA 
 
In Benkharbouche, after undertaking an analysis of relevant international instruments 
and an extensive review of State practice, Lloyd Jones LJ concluded that, sections 
16(1)(a) and 4(2)(b) SIA, in their application to the facts of the present case, went 
beyond what is required by international law and were therefore a disproportionate 
infringement of Article 6(1) ECHR. The basis of his analysis is discussed below. 
 
                                                 
61
 See eg art 5, Convention against Torture and Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) [2012] ICJ Rep 422, 451, para 75 and 454–461, paras 89–117. 
62
 A State may also be under an obligation to grant immunity pursuant to a treaty obligation (that is not 
reflective of customary international law). It is not clear whether this would be sufficient to amount to a 
proportionate restriction on the right of access to a court. See discussion in Section III(c)(2) below.  
63
 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 
123, para 55 (‘States sometimes decide to accord an immunity more extensive than that required by 
international law’). 
64
 Compare to the argument that the alleged violation of a jus cogens norm creates an exception to State 
immunity. This argument has now been rejected by a number of domestic and international courts: 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 140–2; Jones v United 
Kingdom (n 2) paras 197–198; Jones v Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 292–295; Kazemi Estate v 
Islamic Republic of Iran [2014] SCC 62. 
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1. Section 16(1)(a) SIA 
 
The SIA was enacted largely to give effect to the UK’s obligations under the 
European Convention on State Immunity (ECSI), a treaty drafted under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe. As the Court noted, the Treaty does not contain a provision 
requiring immunity to be granted in employment cases involving service members of 
a diplomatic mission,
65
 and so the Court considered whether customary law 
recognized such a rule. It spent considerable time examining Article 11 of the UN 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States (not currently in force), but not 
before noting that it was ‘questionable’ whether the provision constituted customary 
international law at all, let alone whether it could ‘be taken to be a definitive 
statement of the extent of state immunity required by international law in embassy 
employment disputes’.66 Article 11(1) of the UN Convention provides that unless they 
agree otherwise, States cannot invoke immunity in employment proceedings for work 
that has been or will be performed in the forum State, unless one of the exceptions in 
Article 11(2) applies. One such exception is contained in Article 11(2)(b)—State 
immunity is available in employment disputes if the employee is: 
 
(i) a diplomatic agent, as defined in the [VCDR]; 
(ii) a consular officer, as defined in the [VCCR]; [… or] 
(iv) any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity[.] 
 
As Article 37(3) VCDR provides that ‘[m]embers of the service staff of the mission 
who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy 
immunity’ (emphasis added), a literal reading of Article 11(2)(b)(iv) above—‘any 
other person enjoying diplomatic immunity’—suggests that the exception to immunity 
in Article 11(1) does not apply to proceedings involving members of the service staff. 
Therefore, on this reading, Article 11 requires contracting parties to grant immunity in 
employment cases involving embassy service members of staff like those in 
Benkharbouche. However, relying on Foakes and O’Keefe’s authoritative 
commentary to Article 11
67
 and the views of Fox and Webb,
68
 Lloyd Jones LJ 
                                                 
65
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 34. 
66
 Benkharbouche (n 4) paras 30, 29(3) and 36. cf the ECtHR’s assertion, without supporting evidence, 
that art 11 reflects customary law: Sabeh El Leil (n 60) para 58; Oleynikov v Russia (n 60) para 66.  
67
 J Foakes and R O’Keefe, ‘Article 11’ in R O’Keefe and C Tams (eds), The United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: A Commentary 191, 201–2.  
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concluded that such a literal interpretation of Article 11(2)(b)(iv) would ‘run plainly 
contrary to the rationale for the restrictive wording of Article 11(2)(b)(i)’ (which 
makes special provision for a diplomatic agent) and the travaux préparatoires, which 
demonstrate that Article 11(2)(b) ‘was not intended to require immunity in respect of 
employment claims by all members of a mission’. 69  Therefore, not only is it 
questionable whether Article 11 reflects customary international law, but a reasonable 
interpretation of that provision indicates that it does not require the scope of immunity 
provided by the effect of section 16(1)(a).
70
 
 Turning to State practice, Lloyd Jones LJ concluded on the basis of ‘extensive 
research’71 that it was 
 
impossible to conclude that there is any rule of international law which requires 
the grant of immunity in respect of employment claims by members of the 
service staff of a mission in the absence of some special feature such as where 
the claim is for recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an 
individual or where the proceedings would interfere with the security interests 
of the state.
72
 
 
Accordingly, section 16(1)(a) SIA ‘is not required by international law and is not 
within the range of tenable views of what is required by international law’.73  
 The Court was correct to conclude that there is no generally accepted rule that 
State immunity must be granted in employment cases involving service members of a 
mission. As Garnett has demonstrated persuasively,
74
 the UK is ‘almost alone among 
developed countries in continuing to deprive embassy employees occupying 
subordinate positions of rights of redress in the event of any dispute arising in respect 
of their employment.’75 However, this divergent practice—which does at least include 
some States whose law grants immunity in cases involving members of the service 
                                                                                                                                           
68
 H Fox and P Webb, The Law of State Immunity (OUP 2013) 450.   
69
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 36. See Foakes and O’Keefe (n 67) 201–2, who suggest that the drafters’ 
intention was to ‘limit this residual category of employees [art 11(2)(b)(iv)] to miscellaneous persons 
of diplomatic status not already mentioned in Article 11(2)(b)’. 
70
 See Garnett (n 35). 
71
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 42.  
72
 ibid para 46.  
73
 ibid para 53.  
74
 See R Garnett, ‘State Immunity in Employment Matters’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 81–124; R Garnett, ‘The 
Precarious Position of Embassy and Consular Employees in the United Kingdom’ (2005) 54(3) ICLQ 
705–18; and Garnett (n 35). 
75
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 47, referring to Garnett (2005) (n 74) 707.  
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staff of a diplomatic mission 
76—arguably undermines the court’s conclusion that the 
UK position is not even within the ‘range of tenable views’ (Lloyd Jones LJ did not 
elaborate on what he meant by this).
77
 In Jones v United Kingdom, the UK argued that 
it had adopted a ‘tenable view’ of its obligations under international law. 78  The 
ECtHR did not respond to this point, but when concluding that the findings of the 
House of Lords on the question of immunity in that case were ‘neither manifestly 
erroneous nor arbitrary’, it did note that their Lordships had based their decision on 
‘extensive references to international law materials and consideration of the 
applicant’s arguments and the judgment of the Court of Appeal’, and crucially that 
‘[o]ther national courts have examined in detail the findings of the House of Lords in 
the present case and have considered those findings to be highly persuasive’.79 If the 
ECtHR was suggesting that the House of Lords offered at least a ‘tenable view’ as to 
the customary law of immunity, then it is a high threshold, and one that section 
16(1)(a) would struggle to meet.  
 
2. Section 4(2)(b) SIA 
 
Lloyd Jones LJ also concluded that section 4(2)(b) SIA, which grants State immunity 
under UK domestic law if the employee was not habitually resident when the contract 
was made or carried out, was not required by customary international law. This 
provision implements the UK’s obligation under Article 5(2)(b) of the ECSI, which 
grants immunity to States in employment disputes if ‘at the time when the contract 
was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor 
habitually resident in that State’. As neither Libya nor Sudan was a contracting party 
to the ECSI, the question remained whether customary international law itself 
required immunity in such circumstances. However, it is not clear that even if the 
defendant State were party to the ECSI that the grant of immunity by a UK court 
                                                 
76
 See eg practice discussed in Benkharbouche (n 4) paras 43–44, Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 
1981, section 5 (South Africa) and State Immunity Ordinance 1981, sections 6 and 17(1)(a) (Pakistan). 
77
 The Court also did not outline the criteria for identifying customary international law.  
78
 The ‘tenable view’ approach has been adopted by some UK judges when assessing whether a 
decision-makers’ reliance on an unincorporated treaty provision has given rise to a legitimate 
expectation that the decision-maker act in accordance with the correct interpretation of that provision.  
See R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2009] 1 AC 756, 852 (Lord 
Brown), referring to the argument made by P Sales and J Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic 
Courts: The Developing Framework’ (2008) 124 LQR 388, 405–6.  
79
 Jones v United Kingdom (n 2) para 214.  
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would be considered a proportionate restriction on the complainants’ right of access 
to a court. The ECtHR has always referred to ‘generally recognized rules of public 
international law’ as being, in principle, a proportionate restriction on the right of 
access to a court; a rule in a treaty to which there are only eight States parties 
arguably does not amount to a ‘generally recognized’ rule of international law. 
Equally, however, if restricting access to court pursuant to a treaty obligation were not 
a proportionate limitation on the right of access to a court, this would present a 
conflict of obligations between the ECHR and ECSI, two treaties that originate from 
the same international organization (the Council of Europe). It is not clear as a matter 
of treaty law that the ECHR should be prioritized over the ECSI, which for several of 
the eight State parties was ratified after the ECHR.
80
 It is equally unclear whether the 
EU Charter—as primary law of the EU—should be prioritized over an EU Member 
State’s obligations under the ECSI.  
 On the question whether Article 5(2)(b) ECSI also constituted a rule of 
customary international law, Lloyd Jones LJ observed that other State parties to the 
ECSI had only applied Article 5(2)(b) in claims where the defendant State was also a 
State Party,
81
 which provided ‘compelling support for the view that there is no rule of 
[general] international law which requires the grant of immunity in the circumstances 
identified in section 4(2) SIA’.82 The Court also noted that a similar provision to 
section 4(2)(b) was included in the ILC Draft Articles 1991 but not included in the 
final text of the UN Convention on State Immunity, its deletion having been 
recommend by the ILC Working Group, on the basis that the provision ‘could not be 
reconciled with the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality’.83 Finally, 
Lloyd Jones LJ went on to consider whether there were any other legitimate 
objectives that might be achieved by section 4(2)(b), but concluded that there were 
none.
84
 Section 4(2)(b) was therefore discriminatory on grounds of nationality and not 
required by international law.
85
 
                                                 
80
 However, see Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 
1, paras 150–156 (and more recently, Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 9, paras 126–
128), where the ECtHR effectively suggests that the lex posterior rule does not apply to obligations 
under the ECHR, and States’ EU obligations must be carried out in a way that respects the ECHR.  
81
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 56. See French Consular Employee Claim 86 ILR 583 (Austrian Supreme 
Court) and De Queiroz v State of Portugal 115 ILR 430 (Labour Court of Brussels). 
82
  Benkharbouche (n 4) para 56.  
83
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 59, referring to UNYBILC (1999) vol II [87].  
84
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 63, rejecting several objectives, including protection of the sovereign 
functions of an embassy, ensuring a sufficient jurisdiction link between the claim/employee and the 
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On the basis of the above analysis, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
application of sections 16(1)(a) and 4(2)(b) SIA in Benkharbouche constituted a 
disproportionate limitation to the complainants’ Article 6(1) ECHR right of access to 
a court. The Court issued a declaration of incompatibility pursuant to section 4(2) of 
the Human Rights Act (HRA).
86
 However, as the appellants’ claims involved rights 
under the Working Time Regulations and EU racial discrimination and harassment 
law, the Court also had to consider the compatibility of the above provisions of the 
SIA with the EU Charter. 
 
D. Application of Article 47 EU Charter 
 
Arden LJ wrote for the Court on the question of the compatibility of sections 16(1)(a) 
and 4(2)(b) SIA with the EU Charter. She began by citing Article 47(1) EU Charter 
and noting that it was common ground among the parties that the content of Article 47 
is identical to that of Article 6(1) ECHR.
87
 Strictly speaking, this is not correct: as 
noted above, Article 47(1) is equivalent to Article 13 ECHR, and only 47(2) is 
equivalent to Article 6(1). This is important because 47(1) guarantees an effective 
remedy, but 47(2) ‘only’ provides a right of access to a court. The complainants’ in 
Benkharbouche are not arguing that the UK law fails to provide an effective remedy 
as such; but rather, that the UK has denied them access to a court in order to enforce 
that remedy. Nevertheless, Arden LJ proceeded on the basis that because the grant of 
immunity under the SIA breached Article 6(1) ECHR, it also infringed Article 47 of 
the EU Charter.
88
 
                                                                                                                                           
UK (art 4(1) ensures a sufficient link), avoiding opportunistic changes of nationality or habitual 
residence, and preventing the prioritization of the employment law of the forum State over that of the 
foreign State.  
85
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 64. See H Fox and P Webb, The Law of State Immunity (OUP 2013) 454 
and H Fox, ‘Employment Contracts as an Exception to State Immunity: Is All Public Service 
Immune?’ (1995) 66 BYBIL 97, 172. 
86
 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 68. 
87
 ibid para 71. 
88
 Art 52(3) of the EU Charter stipulates that the Charter rights have the same meaning and scope of 
ECHR as the equivalent ECHR rights, but ‘this provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection’. R Garnett (2015) (n 35) has explained that ‘an argument could be made that to 
give full effect and ‘‘extensive protection’’ to EU rules, international law principles that obstruct their 
operation, such as State immunity, must give way in all circumstances. While such a result creates a 
difference in scope between the rights under the ECHR and the Charter, such discrepancy could be 
justified by the need to fully implement EU law, even where it conflicts with international law.’  
Although depending on the extent of the protection provided by EU law, this may result in making 
‘immunity rules redundant’.  
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Arden LJ then went on to consider whether Article 47 has horizontal direct 
effect, so that ‘the appellants can rely on it even though Libya is not a Member State 
or one of the EU institutions referred to in Article 51 of the EU Charter’.89 However, 
with respect, this assertion is not quite correct: it is far from clear that Article 47 is 
capable of having horizontal effect as such, ie that it is capable of being enforced 
against a private party, let alone that it is required to be understood as having 
horizontal effect in the present case; that is, because neither Libya nor Sudan is an EU 
Member State. On the contrary, the right of access to a court is a right enforced 
against the State—ie it is effective against the forum State in which the claim is 
brought, not against the defendant state, ie, the private party against whom the claim 
is brought. In Benkharbouche, the Court conflated the employment claim between the 
parties (for the purposes of this claim, a dispute between private privates)
90
 with the 
separate claim that the grant of immunity by the UK court infringed the complainants’ 
right of access to a court in the UK as guaranteed under Article 47(2). The 
complainants were seeking to enforce a right against the UK. Although the 
enforcement of that right indirectly affected the relationship between the private 
parties insofar as it allowed the complainants to bring their claim before a UK court, it 
did not impose additional obligations on the foreign States, which were already bound 
by UK law, including the Working Time Regulations (incorporating the Working 
Time Directive) and the Equality Act 2010 (incorporating parts of the discrimination 
and harassment Directive), by virtue of engaging in an employment relationship 
within UK jurisdiction.
91
 The right of access to a court under the EU Charter therefore 
has indirect effect, in that it modifies the scope of the SIA, the consequence of which 
is to allow a private party to bring a claim against another private party. This is 
conceptually different to horizontal effect, which would involve one private party 
enforcing a Charter right against another; ie the Charter right is imposed on the other 
party. 
                                                 
89
 ibid para 75. 
90
 It is worth underscoring that the parties in Benkharbouche are private parties not because Libya and 
Sudan are not EU Member States, but because they are engaged in a private activity (‘acta jure 
gestionis’). 
91
 The immunity is from the State’s adjudicative jurisdiction and not immunity from application of the 
law or immunity from legal liability. See in relation to diplomatic immunity Dickinson v Del Solar v 
Mobile and General Insurance Company, Limited (Third Parties) [1930] 1 KB 376, 380 (Lord Hewart 
CJ) (‘Diplomatic agents are not, in virtue of their privileges as such, immune from legal liability for 
any wrongful acts. The accurate statement is that they are not liable to be sued in the English Courts 
unless they submit to the jurisdiction. Diplomatic privilege does not import immunity from legal 
liability, but only exemption from local jurisdiction.’). 
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As the Charter right was being enforced against the UK, it was irrelevant that 
Libya and Sudan were not EU Member States. The issue in the case was not between 
the foreign State’s right of immunity and the complainants’ right of access to a court, 
but simply whether the UK—in barring its court’s jurisdiction in a case involving the 
application of EU law—had violated Article 47 of the EU Charter, a general principle 
of EU law. It is also irrelevant to the application of the EU Charter, and to the rights 
derived from EU law, that the plaintiffs were not UK citizens: the EU Charter applies 
to Member States when they are ‘implementing Union law’; it is not restricted to EU 
or UK citizens. The purpose of the EU Charter is to ensure that while applying and 
implementing EU law, Member States do so in a manner that is compatible with basic 
fundamental rights applicable at the EU level, one of which is to provide for the right 
of access to a court where it is alleged that those rights have been breached.  
After finding that Article 47 is a general principle of EU law because it ‘does 
not depend on its definition in national legislation to take effect’ and has long been 
stated as a general principle by the CJEU,
92
 Arden LJ concluded that the right has 
horizontal direct effect in UK law. She then considered whether the ruling in R 
(Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice applied to Benkharbouche. In Chester, Lord 
Mance, writing for the Supreme Court, held that a court has discretion to choose not 
to set aside domestic statutes where to do so would require the court to effectively 
design a new statutory scheme.
93
 The reason for this is that both as a matter of EU law 
and under section 2(4) of the EU Act, a national court is only required to give effect 
to EU law ‘within the limits of its jurisdiction’. In Chester, which concerned 
prisoners’ voting rights, those limits were defined by the constitutional principles 
underpinning the separation of powers doctrine,
94
 which led the Supreme Court to 
conclude that it was not institutionally competent to ‘devise an alternative scheme of 
voting eligibility that would or might pass muster in a domestic or supra-national 
European court’.95 In Benkharbouche, this was not an issue for Arden LJ, who found 
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 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 80. 
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 This includes defence to Parliament on constitutional grounds (the proper allocation of responsibility 
between branches of government) and on institutional grounds (practical limits on the court’s 
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95
 [2014] AC 271, 316, para 74. 
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that the ‘scope of disapplication in this case is clear’,96 and sections 16(1)(a) and 
4(2)(b) SIA should therefore be set aside pursuant to section 2 of the EC Act.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Benkharbouche decision provides a careful and welcome examination of State 
immunity in employment cases involving domestic service members of an embassy. 
The Court’s conclusion that immunity is not required by customary international law 
on the facts of Benkharbouche is surely correct, even if the Court perhaps went too far 
in stating that the UK’s position is not even within the range of tenable views. 
However, the Court’s analysis of the right of access to a court—particularly its 
application of Article 47 of the Charter—is less convincing. Contrary to the analysis 
set out by the Court, a more convincing interpretation of sovereign immunity is that it 
bars, but does not remove ab initio, the jurisdiction of a court. The right of access to a 
court is breached by the forum State whenever a court declines to exercise jurisdiction 
it otherwise possesses. Article 47 does have an indirect effect on the parties to the 
original dispute in that it lifts the bar to the court’s jurisdiction, but it cannot properly 
be understood as placing the forum State in breach of international law, 
notwithstanding the diplomatic consternation that it may cause.  
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 Benkharbouche (n 4) para 85. 
